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- James H. Clarke, Vanderbilt University
- Kevin M. Kostelnik, Idaho National Laboratory
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2
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3
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- Anaconda/Old Works Superfund Site, MT
- Love Canal Disposal Facility, NY
- Maxey Flats LLW Disposal Facility, KY
- Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO
- Spring Valley/American University, DC
- Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Cell, PA
- Canonsburg UMTRCA Disposal Cell, PA
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4
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5
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6
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- Cases illustrate various isolation configurations
- Sacrifice Zones – e.g.,Maxey Flats, Love Canal
- Reuse Zones - Anaconda
- 13 types of contaminant isolation controls
- 9-12 per site; average of 10
- Information Management, Stakeholder Awareness, Ordinances, and Physical
Site Security at all sites
- Not all controls performing as expected
- Potential errors involved Institution Controls and Maintenance
- Stakeholder Awareness, Information Management
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7
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8
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9
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- Master Logic Diagrams graphically show “how” errors and failures can
occur
- Individual controls were found to contain many single-point errors
(i.e., non-robust)
- Control errors can be viewed as precursors to failure
- Inadequate Information management, stakeholder awareness and maintenance
resources are key Initiating events
- Facility failure requires both engineered barrier and institutional
control errors
- Maintenance is a critical “Institutional Responsibility”
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10
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11
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12
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13
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14
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